Maria Abou Chakra

Abou Chakra photo

Max Planck Institute for Evolutionary Biology August Thienemann Str-2 24306, Ploen, Germany

Research interests: Theoretical Morphology: Echinoid growth, Cellular Automata: Embryonic development and cell interactions, Evolutionary Game Theory: Collective-risk games, Host-Parasite interactions: Red Queen dynamics, Eco-evo dynamics to address the maintenance of sex: Modelling rotifer and algae populations

Collective risk-dilemmas and risky climate game

Abstract

A collective-risk social dilemma arises when a group must cooperate to reach a common target in order to avoid the risk of collective loss while each individual is tempted to free-ride on the contributions of others. In contrast to the prisoners' dilemma or public goods games, the collective-risk dilemma encompasses the risk that all individuals lose everything. These characteristics have potential relevance for dangerous climate change and other risky social dilemmas. Climate change relief is truly the most influential cooperative act we can be a part of, especially since our decisions now may influence the decisions of future generations. However, collaborative prospects are disheartening due to the uncertainties associated with Climate change and the diversity of the actors involved (eg. wealth). Cooperation is costly to the individual and it only benefits all individuals if the common target is reached. An individual thus invests without guarantee that the investment is worthwhile for anyone. If there are several subsequent stages of investment, it is not clear when individuals should contribute. Thus, in this game, the timing of contributions becomes a strategic variable that allows individuals to interact and influence one another. Herein, we investigate the strategic behavior using an evolutionary model of such collective-risk dilemmas in a finite population; every individual takes part in many games and successful behaviors spread in the population. Individual contributions depend on the stage of the game and on the sum of contributions made so far. Thus far prediction have shown that, the best strategy was to `wait and see'. This was consistent under homogeneity, heterogeneity, target uncertainty, across round number and various group sizes. However one key difference in heterogeneity, the rich players contribute in excess in oder to compensate for the missing contributions of the poor. The rich can contribute more because they possess more, simulations show that as heterogeneity increases, rich contributions also increase. In our model, we do not assume rationality and the agents do not have a sense of fairness. Our results show, rich individuals will contribute more since they have more to loose. It is in their best interest to meet the target, even if it also benefits everyone else.

Climate change relief is truly the most influential cooperative act we can be a part of, especially since our decisions now may influence the decisions of future generations. However, collaborative prospects are disheartening due to the uncertainties associated with Climate change (e.g. risks or target uncertainty) and the diversity of the actors involved (e.g. wealth or intergenerational). Collective-risk dilemmas have gained grounds in modelling climate change negotiations on both the experimental level and the theoretical level. In this social dilemma, a group of individuals must interact and work together to reach a target or face serious risks. For climate change, this refers to the nations negotiating the amount of funds allocated to infrastructure that would reduce carbon emissions; this could also refer to the global population, where each person must reduce their overall carbon footprint. In both cases, individuals must sacrifice and contribute towards the benefit of others, the planet, and even, generations to come. Herein, we investigate the strategic behavior using an evolutionary model of such collective-risk dilemmas in a finite population; every individual takes part in many games and successful behaviors spread in the population. Individual contributions depend on the stage of the game and on the sum of contributions made so far. Thus far prediction have shown that, the best strategy was to `wait and see'. This was consistent under homogeneity, heterogeneity, target uncertainty, across round number and various group sizes. Our results show, rich individuals will contribute more since they have more to loose. It is in their best interest to meet the target, even if it also benefits everyone else.